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JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF WRITTEN
RULES*
Alfred Rieg**
If there is a legal term with multiple meanings,' it is the word
"interpretation." As a first and very broad definition, the term "interpretation" can be considered as synonymous with "the function of
the jurist,"' whose task consists entirely of interpreting. This definition, used exclusively by legal philosophers, is not the one which we
shall follow here. A second and much more widespread meaning of
the word "interpretation" refers to the activity of the judge who, on
the one hand, attempts to determine the scope of an ambiguous or
obscure text and, on the other hand, attempts to elaborate a solution when the text presents a gap.8 Despite appearances, these are
two distinct intellectual functions which should not be confused by
including them under the single concept of "interpretation."' In
reality, both interpreting the law and filling the gaps of the law are
related to a more general notion which constitutes their common
denominator-that of the application of the rule of law.' Thus, it is
fitting to eliminate the hypothesis of silent law; additionally, the
very title of the subject, interpretation of written rules, calls for
this elimination. The term "interpretation," therefore, will be taken
here in its narrow definition of "determining the meaning of a text,"
whether it be with regard to a statute or a regulation. In fact, as it
has been said, "[firom a given text, a single meaning must be considered as correct, and it is in the search for this one meaning that
interpretation is properly engaged."'
* This article is the text of a paper on the topic of "Interpretation by the Judge
of Written Rules of Law," delivered at a recent annual meeting of the Association
Henri Capitant held in Louisiana. The translation was prepared by Joyce Ng and
reviewed by Professor Alain Levasseur.
** Professor at the Faculty of Law and Political Science, Director of the Institute
of Comparative Law, Strasbourg, France.
1. The plurality of meaning also exists in everyday language. See 4 E. LITTRP.
DICTIONNAIRE DE LA LANGUE FRAN(AISE Interprtation(1969).

2. See Villey, L'interpritation dans le droit, in 17 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU
DROIT 3 (1972), where it is stated that "Itihe function of the jurist can be called interpretation."
3. See, e.g., 1 A. WEILL, DROIT CIVIL n° 186 (3d ed. 1973). See also F. G9NY,
METHOD OF INTERPRETATON AND SOURCES OF PRIVATE POSITIVE LAW (2d ed. La. St. L.
Inst. trans. 1963).
4. See 1 C. AUBRY ET C. RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS no 171 (7th ed. 1964).
5. See 1 G. MARTY ET P. RAYNAUD. DROIT CIVIL no 128 (2d ed. 1956). See also 4 E.
BACH, ENCYLOP9DIE DALLOZ-DROIT CIVIL Jurisprudence no' 90-145 (1973), which
distinguishes stricto-sensu interpretation from filling in the gaps.
6. C. AUBRY ET C. RAU, supra note 4, at no 169.
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The institutions likely to interpret the law are various.' In the
first place, one can think of the legislator himself to be in an excellent position to determine the meaning of those statutes which he
authored. The system devised after the revolution had, indeed,
created the device of the rdferd legislatif, whereby difficulties of interpretation arising in the course of a trial were submitted to the
legislator. This system, however, failed and was discarded in 1837.
Nevertheless, today's legislator still has the authority to enact
statutes of interpretation in order to throw light on the provisions
of a previously passed statute considered obscure; but, in practice,
such statutes are rare and play no real role.
Interpretation can also be the work of the administration and
take the form of administrative circulars and ministerial responses
to written questions of parliamentarians. These two modes of interpretation show an incontestable tendency of becoming more
prevalent today.' It is true that the Cour de cassation refuses to attribute any binding force to the ministerial circulars9 and quite often
reminds trial courts that these circulars cannot impose on them the
meaning and scope of the provisions interpreted by the circulars.'"
As for the ministerial response to written questions from parliamentarians, the Cour de cassation has always admitted that the
response constitutes only a simple advisory opinion which does not
bind the judge in any way. Without a doubt, however, reality is different; the interferences between administrative and judicial interpretations are evident.1' Indeed, both the power of interpretation
and the duty under article 4 of the Code civil to interpret written
rules belong mainly to the judges, so much so that the writers do
not hesitate to speak of "the pre-eminence of judicial
interpretation."1 Therefore, judicial interpretation will be the only
mode of interpretation with which we shall concern ourselves
herein.
7.

See 1 J.

GHESTIN ET

G. GOUBEAUX,

MARTY ET P. RAYNAUD, supra

TRAITIt DE DROIT CIVIL n'

319-29 (1977); G.

note 5, at no 130.

8. On the explanation of this phenomenon, especially on that which concerns
written questions, see Oppetit, Les rdponses ministdrielles aux questions dcrites des
parlementaires et linterprtationdes lois, D.1974.Chron.107.
9. The Conseil dEtat has adopted a less definite position. See J. GHESTIN ET G.
GOUBEAUX, supra note 7, at no 324.
10. See, e.g., Judgment of 23 juin 1976, Cass. soc., 119761 Bull. Civ. no 394; Judgment of 26 juin 1974, Cass. soc., [19741 Bull. Civ. no 392; Judgment of 15 nov. 1972,
Cass. civ., [19721 Bull. Civ. no 614; Judgment of 9 oct. 1972, Cass. com., 119721 Bull. Civ.
no 242; Judgment of 28 avril 1966, Cass. civ., [1966 Bull. Civ. no 501; Judgment of 14
dec. 1965, Cass. civ., 119651 Bull. Civ. no 706.
11. For enlightening proof, see Oppetit, supra note 8.
12. J. GHESTIN FT G. GOUBEAUX. supra note 7, at no 321. See also G. MARTY ET P.
RAYNAUD, supra note 5, at no 130.
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In contrast with certain more modern foreign codes, the Code
civil does not formulate any principles for the interpretation of laws.
Several writers in the past had admitted by analogy the application
therein of codal provisions relative to the interpretation of contracts 8 on the ground that with both laws and contracts, it was a
matter of interpretation of intentions." This approach was very
much contested and does not appear to have any proponents today;
in fact, the bringing together of the statute, considered as the expression of a general will, and of the agreement, envisaged as the
expression of the will of the parties, is more than artificial.'5 That
analogies are possible between the two mechanisms is not deniable,"
but one cannot reasonably draw any rules on interpretation of written norms from these articles.' 7
In the silence of the Code, the problem of methods of interpretation became the subject of abundant legal literature. Certain of the
numerous published works, beginning with the M4thode d'interprdtation et sources en droit priv6 positif (Method of Interpretation
and Sources of Private Positive Law) of Dean Franqois G6ny, have
remained famous. One must admit, however, that the works in question were only successful with legal theoreticians; the courts, on the
contrary, remained closed to the suggestions contained in these
works.' 8 This is not to say that judges do not employ certain
methods for interpreting the law; judges simply do not accord the
same importance, as does doctrine, to this problem. It has been said
that "doctrinal controversies do not appear in judicial decisions.""
In truth, it is often very difficult to find, through the framework
of a decision, the precise reasoning followed by the judge. It has
often been stressed that French judgments and decisions do not explicitly offer
responses to the problem of the methods of interpretationand,
more particularly, to the choice between the numerous methods
which exist. Why was one text strictly construed and another
liberally construed? Why, with respect to the same provision,
13.
14.

See C. civ. arts. 1156-64 (Fr.).
1 C. AUBRY ET C. RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 40 & n.2 (6th ed. 1936). 1 G.

BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET M. HOUQUES-FOURCADE, DES PERSONNES, as contained in 3 G.
°

BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAIT9 THI9ORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL n

256 bis. (2d ed.

1902).
See C. AUBRY ET C. RAU, supra note 4, at no 169.
16, See 1 J. CARBONNIER, DROIT CIVIL n° 39 (10th ed. 1974). Batiffol, Questions de
l'interprdtationjuridique, in 17 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 12-13, 21 (1972).
17. See C. civ. arts. 1156-64.
18. See G. MARTY ET P. RAYNAUD, supra note 5, at no 130 bis.; 1 H. MAZEAUD, J.
MAZEAUD ET L. MAZEAUD, LEQONS DE DROIT CIVIL no 110 (5th ed. 1972).
19. G. MARTY ET P. RAYNAUD, supra note 5.
15.
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has the jurisprudence shifted from the first approach to the second approach? The commentator often ponders over these attitudes and comes up only with guesses as responses."
Therein lies a great difference with the judicial decisions of the common law countries, of which it has been said that "jurists who read
the decision understand why it was so rendered."'" Therefore, eminent writers have recently asked the French courts, especially the
Cour de cassation, to justify their decisions in a more explicit manner.2 It is feared, however, that, considering the traditions and
habits of the court, this request is simply wishful thinking.
It is not an exaggeration to say that, in the matter of interpretation of written rules, all or nearly all pose a problem and nothing is
definitely clarified. Indeed, the reading of doctrinal works may communicate a different impression; but confrontation with the raw
material of judicial decisions does not cease to give rise to perplexity.
The jurist is thus called upon to ask himself the following two questions of logical, but unequal, importance: (1) When does interpretation take place? and (2) How does interpretation take place? This
dual questioning may seem commonplace, and undoubtedly it is.
However, the answers that can be supplied are far from being
satisfactory to a mind concerned with certainty.
20. Batiffol, supra note 16, at 15-16. See also Boulanger, La methode depuis le
Code civil de 1804 au point de vue de 1interpr4tationjudiciaire, in TRAVAUX DE LA SEMAINE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT, PARIS, 1950 at 331 (1954). "[Tlhe interpreter must not
only expose but reformulate this reasoning. An elementary intellectual integrity requires that we recognize that there exists in the subject of our study something
unalterably conjectural." Id at 343-44.
21. Touffait et Tune, Pour une motivation plus explicite des ddcisions de justice
notamment de celles de la Cour de cassation, 72 REV. TRIM. DR. CIV. 487 (1974) [REVUE
TRIMESTRIELLE DE DROIT CIVIL] (Fr.).
See also Barham, La mdthodologie du droit civil de l'Etat de Louisiane, 1975 REV.
INT. DR. COMP.

797

[REVUE INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPAR91

(Fr.). Former Justice

Barham, speaking of these jurisprudential decisions of his state, says:
Most practitioners remain attached to long decisions which greatly develop the
foundations of law and the reasoning that inspired the decision of the court ....
At the very moment when Professor Tune declared himself a supporter of more
explicit decisions on the part of French courts, it appears to us that one of the important functions of a judge is to describe the method by which he arrives at his
decision in a given case.
Barham, supra, at 810.
22. Touffait et Tunc, supra note 21.
23. The article of Touffait and Tune has received approval of its principle, but
with several qualifications. See Lindon, La motivation des arr~ts de la Cour de cassation, J.C.P.1975.2681. The article has also received opposition to its principle. See
Breton, L 'arrttde la Cour de cassation, in 23 ANNALES DE L'UNIVERSITI DES SCIENCES
SOCIALES DE TOULOUSE 5, 22 (1975).
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JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
THE DOMAIN OF INTERPRETATION

Judicial interpretation consisting of determining the meaning of
a text is permitted only where the text is obscure, ambiguous, or
simply vague. Such is, in fact, the principle formulated by
jurisprudence and doctrine; the principle, however, admits of some
derogations.
The Principle
Interpretation stops when a text is clear: interpretatiocessat in
claris. Numerous writers consider that this maxim still continues to
be valid. It leads to denying all power of interpretation to the judge
when he is faced with a clear and precise text. 4 The jurisprudence,
in fact, follows this pattern and refuses, in principle, to find out
whether the legislative intent might have been different from what
is clearly expressed in the text. This jurisprudential tendency is evident from reading the following in a decision:
Whereas the Court is presented with a text whose clarity and
precision do not permit the Court to interpret it as the party
would have the Court do, even if it is likely that its draft does
not correspond to the real legislative intent; whereas, to grant
to the Courts the possibility, under pretext of interpretation to
modify or restrict the import of a statute which is not ambiguous and is sufficiently comprehensive would amount to
authorizing the judge to substitute himself for the legislator. 5
When utilizing this power of interpretation for obscure and ambiguous texts, the jurisprudence particularly makes recourse to
preparatory works. In fact, a long line of decisions has established:
[11f, in principle, recourse to preparatory works is permitted
when a text requires interpretation, the judge, to the contrary,
must refrain from recourse to preparatory works where the
meaning of the law such as it appears in the draft is neither
obscure nor ambiguous, and consequently, must be looked upon
as certain."
24. See C. AUBRY ET C. RAu. supra note 4, at n0 169; G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET
M. HOUQUES-FOURCADE, supra note 14, at nO 236; 1 R. BEUDANT ET P. LEREBOURSPIGEONNIPRE, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS no 185 (1934); H. MAZEAUD, J. MAZEAUD ET
L. MAZEAUD. supra note 18, at n' 110. See also the formula contained in the Project of
the Year VIII: "When the law is clear, the letter is not to be disregarded, under the
pretext of pursuing its spirit." PRELIM. BOOK tit. 5, art. 5, cl.1.
25. Judgment of 21 oct. 1946, Riom, D.1947.1.90 note Carbonnier.
26. Judgment of 22 nov. 1932, Cass. civ., D.H.1933.2. See also Judgment of 21 nov.
1898, Cass. req., S.1899.1.193 note Wahl; Judgment of 20 oct. 1891, Cass. civ.,
D.1892.1.57 report by Greffier, J.; Judgment of 4 juin 1889, Cass. civ., D.P.1890.1.351;
Judgment of 9 jan. 1947, Paris, D.1947.2.141; Judgment of 10 avril 1935, Angers,
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Putting the adage interpretatio cessat in claris into practice,
however, is a delicate operation. As shown by recent works on
juridical logic, it is extremely difficult to know when a text is clear.
No criterion for clarity imposes itself a priori; and, as a writer has
seen fit to affirm, "to say that the text is clear is to stress the fact
that, under the circumstances, it is not debated."27 Nevertheless,
that does not mean that it reasonably might not be.
Thus, one cannot speak of a clear text when the legislator uses
vague terms, the content of which must be determined by the judge
on a case by case basis. Article 287 of the Code civil provides that,
following divorce, custody of the children is awarded to either one of
the parents, according to the best interest of the children. It goes
without saying that such a formulation obligates the judge to proceed with an over-all view of the situation, which can lead to granting custody to either the mother or the father. Similarly, article
1397 of the Code civil permits spouses to modify their matrimonial
regime by agreement "in the interest of the family." These words
cannot be defined in a singular fashion, and the Cour de cassation
itself is not in a position to give them an all-inclusive definition. Indeed, in a notable decision of January 6, 1976," the Court enunciated
the following general guideline: "The existence and the legitimacy of
the interest of the family must be the object of comprehensive
determination, the sole fact that one of the members of the family
would risk being hurt should not necessarily prohibit the modification or change contemplated." The precision supplied is incontestably important since the Court indicates to lower court
judges that, in the interpretation of article 1397, the interest of the
family may turn out to be the interest of only one of the family
members; the fact remains that in each instance the judge must
make a concrete determination as to whether the legal condition has
been satisfied. One can, therefore, say that the adage interpretatio
cessat in claris can never be invoked where the draftsman has intentionally used a general clause or formulation.
S.1935.2.222; Judgment of 12 jan. 1927, Nancy, Gaz. Pal. 1927.1.295; Judgment of 21
mars 1925, Trib. civ., Strasbourg, Gaz. Pal. 1925.1.680; Judgment of 7 juill. 1897,
Orl(ans, D.P.1898.2.143.
One cannot fail to make a comparison with the theory of the erroneous interpretation (denaturation)of clear and precise clauses, adopted by the Cour de cassation with
regard to interpreting juridical acts and, more particularly, agreements.
0
27. C. PERELMAN. LOGIQUE JURIDIQUE-NOUVELLE RH9TORIQUE n 25 (1976). See
Perelman, L'interprdtationjuridique, in 17 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 29-30
(1972). See also Kalinowski, Philosophie et logique de l'interpritationen droit, in 17
ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIES DU DROIT 39-42 (1972).
28. Judgment of 6 jan. 1976, Cass. civ., D.1976.1.253 note Ponsard. See Nerson,
Jurisprudence franqaise en mati~re de droit civil-Personnes et droits de families,
1976 REV. TRIM. DR. CIV. 537 n

0

1.
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A text perfectly clear in meaning from the standpoint of ordinary language may not be so from the juridical standpoint. Thus,
article 333 of the Code civil allows the conferring of the benefit of
legitimation by authority of law upon the child whose status is that
of an illegitimate child "if it appears that marriage is impossible between the two parents." "Impossible," in ordinary language, means
"that which cannot be done. 2 9 In effect, the jurisprudence has
acknowledged very logically that this condition is fulfilled in those
cases where the parents cannot marry by reason of an obstacle, objective and beyond their control, such as the death of one of them."
Additionally, however, there exist jurisdictions which consider that,
according to the ratio legis, the meaning of the term "impossible"
could not be the usual meaning and that the impossibility in the
sense of article 333 encompasses both hypotheses, where the
parents cannot marry and where the parents do not want to marry.
Thus, in a decision of December 7, 1976,1 the Cour de Paris did not
hesitate to declare: "The law, which has not distinguished between
the various causes of impossibility, leaves to the judge the task of
appraising, case by case, if, under the circumstances, marriage must
be considered impossible." This broad conception leads to permitting
legitimation by authority of law in cases where one or both parents
refuse to contract marriage. The word "impossible," then, takes on a
very special connotation.
This exemplifies the difficulty of putting into practice the principle that interpretation stops when a text is clear. To the extent that
the clarity of a written rule is decided by the judge himself, it suffices for him, in order to exercise the power of interpretation, to
pretend that there exists an ambiguity or an obscurity. Only the
Cour de cassation, through its regulatory function of jurisprudence,
can then correct possible excesses, if it at least considers it to be
necessary. Thus, not only does the principle interpretatio cessat in
claris lack scientific rigor; but it also suffers true derogations.
The Derogations
As a premise, we assume that the judge finds himself with a
clear text which, therefore, he ought to apply purely and simply;
and yet, he embarks upon an interpretation. These cases are of two
29. E. LITTR, supra note 1, at Impossible.
30. See Judgment of 13 juin 1973, Trib. gr. inst., Strasbourg, D.1974.69 (4th
cahier) note Colombet.
31. Judgment of 7 d&c. 1976, Paris, D.1977.1.297. See Nerson, Jurisprudence
frangaise en matijre de droit civil-Personnes et droits de famile, 1977 REV. TRIM. DR.
clv. 764 n° 4; Raynaud, Jurisprudencefranqaise en matiere de droit civil-Personnes
°
et droits de famille, 1977 REV. TRIM. DR. CIV. 549, n 2.
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types; while the first type may be considered as normal, the second
type is much more dangerous because it threatens to empty the
principle interpretatiocessat in claris of its very substance.
It is commonly acknowledged by the predominant doctrine and
jurisprudence that, in the presence of a clear text, the judge is
granted once again his power of interpretation when it is appropriate "to give meaning to a text inapplicable in its letter or rectifying an evident material error." 2 This is the idea expressed as
follows by the Tribunal civil de la Seine:
Whereas all search for legislative intent by means of interpretation is forbidden to the judge where the meaning of the statute
as it reads is neither obscure nor ambiguous, and consequently
must be regarded as certain ...there is an exception only if the
application of the text resulted in some absurdity.3
Absurdity can arise either from a material error in drafting' or
from antinomic and irreconciliable provisions within the same text.
The typical example is that of article 1112 of the Code civil The
first paragraph of article 1112 requires that the violence capable of
giving rise to annulment of a contract be "of a nature to make an
impression on a reasonable person" so as to make him fearful of considerable harm, while the second paragraph provides that consideration be given "to the age, sex, and condition of the persons." In the
presence of these two antinomic modes of determination, the
jurisprudence has allowed the subjective criterion of the second
paragraph to prevail, in accord with its general conception of the
vices of consent. If the power of tribunals to eliminate the absurdities and antinomies of written rules cannot be seriously contested,
one may, however, hesitate in the second type of derogation.
More and more frequently it happens that, despite the clear
character of a text, the text is interpreted in order to confer upon it
a different meaning from that intended by the legislator. This is a
clear abandonment, pure and simple, of the principle interpretatio
cessat in claris. An illustration of this phenomenon can be found in
the recent jurisprudence concerning the petition to contest the
paternity of the husband provided for by a series of articles in the
Code civil beginning with article 318. The result from these texts is
that the mother can contest the paternity only for the purpose of
legitimation, which supposes the dissolution of the first marriage of
32.

C. AUBRY

ET

C. RAU, supra note 4, at n° 169.

33. Judgment of 24 avril 1952, Seine, J.C.P.1952.2.7108.
34. Judgment of 8 mars 1930, Cass. crim., D.1930.1.101 note Voirin.
The example on point, even though foreign to the civil law, is that of the decree
concerning the rules and regulations of railways, which forbade passengers from boarding or alighting when the train is completely stopped!
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the mother and her marriage to the alleged father. In order for
legitimation to be effected, the child must also possess the status of
being the common child of the mother and the second husband, as
attested to by the express reference made by articles 318(1) to
331(1). In the presence of these texts, corroborated moreover by the
opinion of the reporter of the bill before the National Assembly, the
lower courts have, for several years, denied the action contesting
paternity in the absence of proven possession of status.3 5 However,
in spite of the texts and the preparatory works of the statute, the
Cour de cassation has censured their application and has held in two
decisions of February 16, 1977,6 that the articles alluded to nowhere
required that the child possess the status of being the child of his
mother and the second husband. These decisions caused a great commotion; and an eminent writer did not hesitate to speak of the "erroneous interpretation (d4naturation)of the statute by the Cour de
cassation, especially since the high court did not deign to indicate
reasons for its position. The effect of such jurisprudence is perplexing. One may attempt to find an explanation in the notion of "social
insufficiency" of the law, suggested by a writer" not long ago: "A
text of a law is there, but . . . [it] leads to a solution which the judge
considers bad or simply maladjusted." 9 As a consequence, the judge
deviates from the text in order to arrive at a result which he considers more satisfactory. This explanation undoubtedly enables one
to account for the many distortions that the jurisprudence imposes
on texts a priori clear. However, the concept of "social insufficiency
of the law" can be criticized as being particularly vague; one departs
from the domain of the rational and the foreseeable to venture into
the domain of "juridical policy" in its most subjective state.
Moreover, if one can speak of "social insufficiency" with respect to
old statutes which must be adapted to the modern social order, such
a value judgment appears to be excessive when it is applied to
statutes which date back only a few years.
"17

In short, concerning the "domain" of interpretation of written
rules, the prevailing impression is that of a very great flexibility, if
not a great uncertainty. On the one hand, the courts regularly recall
to mind that there is no place for interpretation of a clear text and,
35. See, e.g., Judgment of 16 avril 1975, Trib. gr. inst., La Rochelle, D.1975.715
(400 cahier) note Huet-Weiller; Judgment of 31 mai 1976, Orl6ans, J.C.P.1977.2.18663,
3d case.
36. Judgment of 16 f~vr. 1977, Cass. civ., J.C.P.1977.2.18663; Judgment of 16 f~vr.
1977, Cass. civ., D.1977.1.328 note Huet-Weiller; Raynaud, supra note 31, at 317, no 4.
37. Mazeaud, Une "ddnaturation" de la loi par la Cour de cassation,
J.C.P.1977.1.2859.
38. Boulanger, supra note 20, at 337, 344.
39. Boulanger, supra note 20, at 344.
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therefore, are respectful of the adage interpetatio cessat in claris.
On the other hand, one must not be deceived by the import of the
principle. First of all, the notion of "clarity" is itself equivocal. Undoubtedly, if article 494 of the Code civil provides that "guardianship may be opened for an emancipated minor as for an adult," the
need for interpretation is non-existent; similarly, if article 36 of the
statute of July 24, 1966, specifies that "the number of partners
[associ4s] of a limited company [socitJ d responsabilit4 limitee;
S.A.R.L.] may not exceed fifty (50)," all interpretation is useless. But
how numerous are the terms and formulas which the jurisprudence
considers as ambiguous or obscure, thus necessitating an interpretation? Have we not recently seen the Plenary Assembly of the Cour
de cassation" ponder over the expression "number of voters" utilized
by an article of the Labor Code [Code du travail] in order to find its
meaning? Here is, however, an expression devoid of all ambiguity a
priori! And then, supposing even that a text is considered to be
clear by the majority opinion, nothing prevents a jurisdiction, and
more especially the Cour de cassation, from proceeding with its interpretation in order to arrive at a result which it considers
preferable. In brief, a cloud of haziness surrounds the domain of interpretation. That is an observation which, at first sight, does not
apply to the methods of interpretation.
THE METHODS OF INTERPRETATION

Doctrine willingly distinguishes "methods of interpretation"
from "techniques or rules of interpretation," 1 adding sometimes that
"if the principles of this method are lively debated, the practical
rules are less lively debated."" In reality, under the term "rules of
interpretation," the writers study primarily the maxims bequeathed
to modern law by jurists of the Middle Ages." In truth, these maxims concern the application of the rule of law to concrete
cases-namely, the determination of its domain of application, and
not its interpretation, viz, the determination of its meaning. The
best proof of this is that these maxims come into play in a general
manner even when a text is perfectly clear." Therefore, we will only
40. Judgment of 2 ddc. 1977, Cass. ass. pldn., D.1978.1.69 Concl. Premier av. gdn.
R. Schmelck.
41. A. WEILL, supra note 3, at n' 186-94.
42. J. CARBONNIER, supra note 16, at n0 37.
43. Examples of these maxims are exceptio est strictissimae interpretationis(exceptions must be strictly construed) and generalis specialibus non derogant (general
provisions do not derogate from special provisions).
44. See G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET M. HOUQUES-FOURCADE, supra note 14, at n'
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examine the methods or techniques available to the judge for determining the meaning of a statute or a ryle.
It is to be remembered at the outset that, in contrast to certain
foreign countries, 45 France does not have strict canons of interpretation and that the Cour de cassation has never defined the various
techniques to be used in determining the meaning of a text; neither
has the Court specific instructions for their use or a hierarchy
among them. Nevertheless, if one attempts to make a synthesis, one
perceives that two factors are predominant: on one side, it is the formula of the written rule itself; on the other side, it is the purpose of
the rule. Interpretation is articulated around one or the other of
these elements.
The Formula
As an initial premise, we assume that the judge finds himself in
the presence of a written rule. It is normal that any interpretation
first rely upon the expression of the text. Still a duality of means is
offered. The judge may at first analyze the expression taken by
itself and proceed by means of what one traditionally calls a "grammatical interpretation"; but he may also, in proceeding by way of
"logical interpretation," consider the expression rationally and in its
relationship to other provisions of positive law.
"Grammatical interpretation" constitutes in all cases the point of
departure of the task of the judge." Its object is to determine the
meaning of the text with the aid of language usage and rules of syntax. As it has been said, it involves "the search for what the terms
[of the statute] signify or may signify in themselves, in an objective
fashion, outside of any search for the drafter's intent and of any consideration of social utility or moral justification, foreign to the letter
of the text under consideration." 7 The terms themselves are to be
taken in their juridical sense, not in that of everyday language. Very
often, grammatical interpretation provides the judge with the key to
the text. But it is not always so, to the extent that certain terms
may have several meanings. For example, the phrase "third parties"
[tiers] sometimes denotes persons absolutely strangers to a contract,
i.e., the penitus extranei; sometimes they denote only certain
45. The Louisiana Civil Code, for example, contains many articles, see LA. CIV.
CODE arts. 13-21, devoted to "the application and the construction of laws." See the
text of these articles in Barham, supra note 21, at 797 n.79.
46. See C. AUBRY ET C. RAU, supra note 4,at n* 170; G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET
°
M. HOUQUES-FOURCADE. supra note 14, at n 259; 1 R. DAVID, LE DROIT FRANQAIS-LEs
140 (1960); F.

DONN.ES FONDAMENTALES DU DROIT FRANCARS.
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R. DAVID, supra note 46.
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101-102 (1954).
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assigns or unsecured creditors of contracting parties. Similarly, the
word "act" [acte] denotes at times the negotium, at another time the
instrumentum. It is necessary, therefore, to supplement grammatical
interpretation with "logical interpretation."
"Logical interpretation" consists of applying to the obscure text
the multiple resources of juridical reasoning. 8 At times, reasoning is
applied to the text taken in isolation; at other times, reasoning encompasses a second text and even several texts.
The most characteristic example of reasoning applied to the text
considered as an entity is that of reasoning a contrario. This reasoning consists of turning around the statement of a text in order to
draw a new inference therefrom and is, therefore, founded on the
premise that if a text asserts something, it is supposed to negate
the contrary. Judges often resort to argument a contrario, without
explaining, moreover, the reasons for choosing this type of argument. Two well known illustrations are found in the law of filiation.
Article 336 of the Code civil relative to acknowledgment of an
illegitimate child, provides that "[riecognition by the father, without
indication of avowal by the mother, is effective only with regard to
the father." As it is drafted, the text, which sanctions the purely individual effect of acknowledgment, is troublesome in its result;
often, the father who acknowledges the child believes that this proves
the two filiations, paternal and maternal. Sharing the same belief,
the mother deems it useless to proceed herself with an acknowledgment; so maternal acknowledgment is not established. Therefore, a
more-than-a-century-old jurisprudence of the Cour de cassation,49 using reasoning a contrario, has adopted a different interpretation of
article 336. The Court infers from the text that the father's
acknowledgment, when giving the identity of the mother and stating
that she recognizes the child, produces an effect toward her. The
solution is all the more interesting in that the avowal of the mother
need not be express but may equally be tacit; it may result, for example, from the fact that the mother brings up the child as her own.
Incontestably, recourse to reasoning a contrario is implicitly
justified by the result to be attained.
More recently, another provision of the Code civil relative to
acknowledgment of an illegitimate has been the subject of analogous
reasoning. Article 334(9) provides that "[a]ny recognition is void, and
any petition for investigation is non receivable, when the child has a
0

48. See C. PERELMAN, supra note 27, at n 33.
49. See, e.g., Judgment of 29 juin 1939, Cass. civ., S.1940.1.121; Judgment of 25
nov. 1913, Cass. civ., S.1914.1.95; Judgment of 25 juin 1877, Cass. civ., D.P.1878.1.262,
S.1878.1.217; Judgment of 7 jan. 1852, Cass. civ., D.P.1852.1.75, S.1852.1.12.
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legitimate filiation already established by possession of status." Interpretation of this text has given rise to an important controversy:
the point debated was the determination of whether the child having only a legal document (birth certificate) to establish his
legitimacy, without the corresponding possession of status, could
have his illegitimate filiation established. One could, in effect, reason
by analogy and say that, the document being one of the modes of
establishment of legitimate filiation, the prohibition of article 334(9)
was equally valid for the case where the child had but one claim to
legitimacy. But one could also reason a contrario and consider that,
since the text only prohibits the establishment of illegitimate filiation if the child enjoys the possession of the status of a legitimate
child, this filiation may be validly established when the child has only
one claim of legitimacy. Such was finally the interpretation adopted
by the Cour de cassation.1 Recourse to reasoning a contrario is explained herein, even though the Cour de cassation did not supply
any indication by ratio legis. In fact, the statute of January 3, 1972,
was intended to favor the role of possession of status in the matter
of filiation by extension of its traditional consequences."
A second form of logical interpretation consists in regarding the
legislative provisions in question no longer in isolation, but rather in
relation to the other rules of positive law.52' In placing the obscure
text in context, the text's meaning becomes more readily apparent.
For example, article 1321 of the Code civil provides that "[clounterletters are effective only between the contracting parties; they are
not effective as against third parties." The meaning of the phrase
"third parties" [tiers] is derived from a comparison to article 1165,
which lays down the principle of the relative effect of agreements;
the third parties alluded to by this latter text are those persons absolutely strangers to the contract, i.e., the penitus extranei Those
third parties alluded to by article 1321 cannot be the same; otherwise, the provision would be divested of all interest. Thus, the
jurisprudence decided that the third parties of article 1321 are those
who have an action by particular title and the unsecured creditors of
contracting parties.
The text to be interpreted is often viewed in relation to general
principles of law, whose belonging to the order of positive law cannot be denied." In the civil law, these principles frequently, but not
50. Judgment of 9 juin 1976, Cass. civ., D.1976.1.593 note Raynaud; Cornu, Observations, J.C.P.1976.2.18494.
51. See C. COLOMBET, J. FOYER, D. HUET-WEILLER ET C. LABRUSSE-RIou, LA FILIAOs
147-55 (2d ed. 1977).
TION LGITIME ET NATURELLE n
52. See Batiffol, supra note 16, at 12, 26.

53.

See J.

cited therein.

GHESTIN ET

G.

GOUBEAUX,

supra note 7, at nOs 446-52 and authorities

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Voi. 40

exclusively, take the form of maxims and adages borrowed from
learned custom; for example, accessorium sequitur principale, nemo
auditur propriam turpitudinem allegans, contra non valentem agere
non currit praescriptio. Indeed, in the majority of these cases, these
principles serve to fill in legislative gaps; it is essentially on this
ground that their role has been viewed. Their function, however, is
broader in that the principles constitute a means of interpretation of
new statutes "which will thus be integrated into the juridical order,
and reconciled with it."54
Grammatical interpretation and logical interpretation applied to
the wording of the text do not constitute, however, the only instruments utilized by the judge. Another element which plays a
primary role is the "purpose of the rule."
The Purpose of the Rule
All written norms are necessarily decreed with a view toward a
determined purpose, knowledge of which serves as a guide for the
judge's interpretation. The goal of a statute or a regulation may be
discovered either in the intent of the drafter or by looking at the
social objectives which the statute was designed to accomplish.
Interpretation founded on the "search for legislative intent"
speaks to the idea that each text reflects the particular concerns of
its drafter and that it then must be interpreted such that the
adopted solution corresponds to this intent. This is a characteristic
method of the "school of exegesis" which enjoyed an immense success during the course of the 19th century before being denounced
by writers such as Saleilles and G ny. 5 It was contended that such a
method led to sterilizing the law, to the extent that the legislative
will to be considered is the one which prevailed during the preparation of the statute. Applied to the Civil Code of 1804, this criticism
was undoubtedly valid; today one no longer asserts that a text of
the Code should be interpreted exclusively in light of the ideas that
motivated the legislator 175 years ago. But that, in no way, signifies
that the method need be rejected outright. It is, in effect, justified
each time the judge finds himself confronted with a new text. Thus,
the search for the legislative intent remains a constant of interpretation."
54. Id. at no 452.
55. On the method of the school of exegesis, see F. GgNY, supra note 46, at nos
12-19; Perelman, supra note 27, at nOs 16-30. For a critical review, see F. GPNY, supra
note 46, at no s 33-34; Husson, Analyse critique de la mithode de rex~g~se, in 17 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 115 (1972).
56. See R. DAVID, supra note 46, at 143: "[Nlumerous court decisions indicate that
this mode of interpretation is often practiced in France." See also J. GHESTIN ET G.
GOUBEAUX, supra note 7, at n' 160, where the authors, speaking of recent reforms in
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This intent is found essentially in the preparatory works, the importance of which for the interpretation of laws has been recently
stressed." Indeed, it frequently occurs that the lower courts refer to
these works. It is necessary, however, to be conscious of the inherent limits of these documents. On the one hand, only the
preparatory works of the statutes per se are published, but not the
preparatory works of the regulations. 5 On the other hand, even for
statutes, one must be careful not to rely solely on the preparatory
works, especially when one considers the imprecision, indeed the
contradiction, inherent in parliamentary debates which do not
always allow disclosure of the deep, underlying intent.
Another type of document has recently assumed a predominant
position. It is the ministerial responses to written questions of
parliamentarians. To the extent that most of the statutes for reforming the civil law and the commercial law have been adopted at the
initiative of the government, the proposals prepared by the
ministers concerned-especially those prepared by the Ministry of
Justice-and the responses given to the questions of the parliamentarians may effectively reflect the intent of the drafters. However,
it is important for all concerned to proceed with caution here; for
one is actually dealing here with governmental interpretation
which, as shown by a brilliant study, often translates "the desire ...
of breaking away from the intent of the legislator." ' One would,
therefore, be going too far by considering ministerial responses to
reflect the thinking which motivated the legislator. Nevertheless,
their influence on judicial interpretation is still certain.'
The search for legislative intent is only a defensible method of
interpretation if the text is recent. When, on the contrary, old
statutes are involved, and in particular Napoleonic codifications, the
purpose of the rule is no longer discovered in the drafters' intent,
but in the social objectives of the legal provision.
Interpretation founded on the "objectives of the rule" is based
on the idea that "the meaning of the statute changes with time,
because it is destined to be applied to conditions existing today, and
family law, likewise write: "The search for legislative intent by the exegetical method
regains all its significance. In particular, recourse to preparatory works, previously so
severely frowned upon, regains a legitimacy which the practive had moreover never
denied it."
57. Couderc, Les travaux prdparatoires de la loi ou la remontde des enfers,
D.1975.Chron.249.
58. In fact, the report which sometimes precedes the text of certain decrees is but
a summary analysis.
59. Oppetit, supra note 8, at 107-09.
60. See the numerous examples cited by Oppetit, supra note 8, at 109-10.
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not to those existing in the more distant past.""1 The text must then
be interpreted in relation to the needs of society prevailing at the
time of the interpretation.
Undoubtedly, one would search in vain for a jurisprudential decision which, in its rationale, refers to such a method of interpretation. It is recognized that whenever judges, especially those of the
Cour de cassation, have adapted obsolete statutes to modern needs,"2
they have done so implicitly by this method. The first example deals
with the notion of "public order and good morals," to which article 6
of the Code civil refers. The significance which the jurisprudence of
today attaches to that notion is very different from that of the nineteenth century. While the concept of "public order" has been
broadened, notably by the creation of an "economic public order,""
the concept of "good morals" has been narrowed." The wording of
article 6 has remained that of the Code Napoleon of 1804, but its
content has been adapted to new needs. The second example refers
to the evolution of the law of delictual liability. Although articles
1382 to 1386 of the Code civil have, by and large, remained unchanged, their import has been modernized. The jurisprudence has in particular created a general system of liability for the acts of things, a
system which the drafters of the Code had never considered. This
creation was achieved by interpretation of the insignificant statement of article 1384(1), which the Cour de cassation isolated and on
which the Court built a truly new theory. Other examples could be
cited which demonstrate that the meaning of the text is fixed in
relation to its social objectives. It is necessary, however, to add that
this method of interpretation, described as "teleological," is more
often resorted to by the Court de cassation than by the lower
courts. 5
Thus, a plurality of techniques is available to the courts for
determining the meaning of a written rule. As Carbonnier pointed
out: "[T]he jurisprudence today practices a tactical eclecticism in its
method of interpretation."6 At the point of departure, whatever be
the text, the interpretation thereof is always grammatical; but,
61. R. DAVID. supra note 46, at 143-44.
62. For a critique of this notion, see Atias et Linotte, Le mythe de 'adaptationdu
droit au fai D.1977.Chron.251.
63. See G. FARJAT. LORDRE PUBLIC t]CONOMIQUE (1963).
64. For instance, in the nineteenth century, jurisprudence would consider "matchmaker" agreements as immoral.
65. See R. DAVID, supra note 46, at 147, who speaks of "the most extensive use of
the teleological method of interpretation when one considers the judges of higher
courts [Cour de cassation, Conseil d'Etat], more prepared to assume responsibilities
than the lower courts in the hierarchy."
66. J. CARBONNIER, supra note 16, at 178 n0 39.

1979]

JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION

when a problem arises, or simply when he wishes to strengthen the
solution drawn from the grammatical interpretation, the judge has
recourse to logical interpretation or to the search for the original intent of the legislator. It is only when the text is outdated that the
courts indulge in the application of the evolutive or teleological
method. In reality, although judges often deny it, one has the impression that the choice of method(s) used is a function of the result
sought. 7 This would explain in particular why, with respect to interpretation of a text, a term is taken in a new light which in no way
corresponds to its usual meaning; this would also explain why the
import of a rule is fixed with the aid of reasoning a contrario, while
reasoning by analogy would be just as acceptable. Indeed, no formal
proof of this assertion is possible; for it is excessively rare that a
decision openly scans the practical consequences of the conceivable
solutions. 8 It remains, however, that many interpretations can be
explained only by the search for a result considered to be more just
or more equitable."
CONCLUSION

The solution that can be suggested to the problems of interpretation are far from being satisfactory to a mind concerned with
certainty. Unfortunately, the developments are evidence of that fact;
and, from an intellectual viewpoint, one has grounds for disappointment. Still, one must make distinctions. What is troublesome is the
haziness hovering over the field of interpretation, the lack of a
precise criterion to determine the clarity of a text. On the other
hand, with respect to the methods of interpretation, it is normal to
leave to the judge a wide latitude and not to impose on him the
"straight jacket" of a given method. Law will never be an exact
science; and, when confronted with a text, a judge will never have
his choice confined by a theorem.
67. See Boulanger, supra note 20, at 354, citing Charles Eisenmann's contention
that the judge begins by choosing the decision he considers the most just. It is then
that he devises a reasoning to justify his solution. But First President Fremicourt of
the Cour de cassation protested against the use of this theory, id. at 553, as also did
President Ancel, id. at 534.
68. See Touffait et Tunc, supra note 21, at no 11.
69. See Agostini, L'dquitd, D.1978.Chron.7.

